University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy
Volume 25

Issue 2

Article 3

2014

The Current Usage and Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses PostStern: Have No Fear
Benjamin Shiekman

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp

Recommended Citation
Shiekman, Benjamin (2014) "The Current Usage and Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses Post-Stern: Have
No Fear," University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy: Vol. 25: Iss. 2, Article 3.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp/vol25/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

THE CURRENT USAGE AND ENFORCEABILITY OF
ARBITRATION CLAUSES POST-STERN: HAVE NO FEAR
Benjamin Shiekman*

IN TRODU CTION ....................................................................................

165

THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT ........................................................ 166
THE CURRENT STATE OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES ................................

167

CONFLICTING IDEOLOGIES-ARBITRATION AND BANKRUPTCY ...........

170

THE BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTIONAL SCHEME ......................................

171

THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT'S POWER-MCMAHON ...................

173

JUDICIAL CASE H ISTORY .....................................................................

175

A. Non-CoreProceedings-Hays.......................................................
B. Core Proceedings-TheThird andFifth Circuits..........................
C. Core Proceedings-TheSecond andFourth Circuits....................
D . Revisiting the Issue- Thorpe .........................................................

175
176
177
179

THE WRENCH-STERN V. MARSHALL ....................................................

181

WHERE Do WE GO FROM HERE? .........................................................

183

C ONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 185

INTRODUCTION

At the intersection of two treacherous winding roads comes a question
that is likely to persist until the Supreme Court of the United States
decides to step in and build a new road, or, at least, lay some new
pavement. The first road is Contractual Arbitration Clause Drive, which

*

Benjamin Shiekman, J.D. 2014. Executive Research Editor. This Note is dedicated to

my loving and wonderful mother, who always inspired me and made me believe I could do
anything. Also, to my grandparents for their tremendous support. A special thanks to Clark
Splichal, the best first mate a guy could ask for. Finally, a special thanks to my great friends,
especially you, Marissa Fallica and Arielle Eisenberg.

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAWAND PUBLICPOLICY

[Vol. 25

through recent Supreme Court decisions' is now more attractive to
corporations than ever. The second road is Title 11, otherwise known as
the Bankruptcy Code, which generally produces as much confusion as
the ending of the movie Inception. The intersection of these two roads
poses the following question: in what situations may an arbitration clause
between a bankruptcy debtor and a creditor of that debtor be enforced?
Currently, there is a split among certain federal circuit courts. Further,
the circuits were quite clear as to the proper application of the law.
However, the addition of The Supreme Court's recent decision in Stern
v. Marshall,2 presents a new facet to the equation. The breadth of the
Stern decision will be vital in determining what course of action is
appropriate when deciding whether parties will be allowed to submit their
dispute to binding arbitration or whether the clause will be wiped clean
and the claim will remain within the bankruptcy court's purview.
This Note will examine the current status and usage of arbitration
clauses, examine how these clauses operate in bankruptcy court, and
identify the two tests circuit appellate courts are using to decide whether
an arbitration clause may stand in bankruptcy court. Next, the effects of
the Stern decision will be addressed before finally positing what the most
appropriate course of action is, should the Supreme Court ever decide to
grant certiorari.
THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT

The Federal Arbitration Act is a set of rules that attempt to make it as
practicable as possible to enforce private contractual arbitration
provisions. The Act "[b]y its terms.

. .

leaves no place for the exercise of

discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts
shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an
arbitration agreement has been signed.",3 Since there is a strong federal
policy favoring arbitration, any doubt regarding enforceability of an
arbitration agreement typically results in courts resolving any ambiguity
in favor of arbitration. While judicial intervention of an arbitrated dispute
is possible both before and after arbitration proceedings commence, "the
judicial deference toward an arbitration panel, as dictated by the
Arbitration Act, goes so far as to remove any authority from the courts to
intervene during an arbitration proceeding." 4 Because of the stranglehold
1. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Am. Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
2. 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
3. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985) (discussing the breadth
of the Federal Arbitration Act).
4. Alan H. Resnick, The Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses in Bankruptcy, 15 AM.
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that the Act has on contractual arbitration provisions, there are only two
ways to avoid binding arbitration.5 First, (albeit irrelevant to this
discussion) is to show that the arbitration agreement within the contract
is invalid because it was procured by fraud or some other scheme. 6 The
second is to show that clear congressional intent precludes arbitration on
the subject matter of the dispute. 7 Thus, to avoid arbitration for a debtor
or creditor in bankruptcy, it must be determined that Congress did not
intend to enforce an arbitration clause in bankruptcy court.
THE CURRENT STATE OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES

Corporate use of arbitration clauses may be widespread, yet
conversely, there is also evidence that suggests their usage is
misperceived and overblown. The public view seems to be that arbitration
clauses are contracts of adhesion where consumers have no choice but to
consent to their use. However, perception is not always reality. Recent
Supreme Court cases have actually made arbitration clauses more
attractive to corporations. Nevertheless, according to one8 recent study,
the use of arbitration clauses has remained fairly stagnant.
9
The Supreme Court's decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
in 2010 serves as a ringing endorsement for the use of arbitration clauses
by corporations.' 0 In Concepcion, two cellular phone customers agreed
in their service contracts to binding arbitration." The customers
subsequently brought suit after finding that phones advertised as "free"
contained a sales tax.' 2 The arbitration provision included a variety of
terms and details benefitting the customer; 13 however, within the
arbitration provision was a directive banning class action suits against
AT&T. 14 This type of provision is known as an "arbitral class waiver"
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 183, 188 (2007).

5. Id. at 189.
6. Id
7. Id. at 189-90.
8. Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, "Sticky" Arbitration Clauses?: The Use
ofArbitrationClauses after Concepcion and Amex, 67 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
9. 131S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
10. Id.
11.

Id. at 1744.

12. Id.
13. Id. ("[T]he agreement specifies that AT&T must pay all costs for nonfrivolous claims;
that arbitration must take place in the county in which the customer is billed; that, for claims of
$10,000 or less, the customer may choose whether the arbitration proceeds in person, by telephone
.... "1).

14. Id. ("[R]equired that claims be brought in the parties' individual capacity, and not as a
plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative proceeding.") (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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and prevents AT&T from being subjected to the corporate disadvantages
of a class action lawsuit. After the trial court and Ninth Circuit found the
arbitration clause unconscionable under California law, 15 the Supreme
Court reversed, stating that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted state
waiver and the
unconscionability laws and
6 upheld both the arbitral class
entire arbitration clause.'
In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,17 the Supreme
Court rejected what is known as the "effective vindication" theory. 18 In
American Express, Italian Colors Restaurant, an acceptor of American
Express cards, was dissatisfied with the fee charged by the credit card
company. 19 Italian Colors brought suit under the federal antitrust laws,
alleging that American Express was engaging in unfair pricing
practices. 20 Italian Colors and American Express's terms of use contained
an arbitration clause, which American Express immediately sought to
invoke.2 1 Further, within that clause was an arbitral class waiver,22
effectively identical to what the plaintiffs in Concepcion were contesting.
When American Express attempted to send the dispute to arbitration,
Italian Colors challenged the clause on the grounds that bringing suit in a
form other than class action was impracticable because of the prohibitive
costs. 23 This is the origin of the "effective vindication" theory.

Italian Colors argued that "[e]nforcing the waiver of class arbitration
bars effective vindication ... because they have no economic incentive

to pursue their antitrust claims individually in arbitration." 24 When the
case eventually reached the Supreme Court in 2013, the Court held the
arbitral class waiver to be enforceable. 25 The Court's opinion consisted
of two key points. First, the Federal Arbitration Act is designed to enforce
arbitration provisions unless a contrary congressional intent appears in an
alternative federal statute. 26 Further, the federal antitrust laws do not
27
evince an intent to preclude the waiver of arbitral class action clauses.
15. Id.at 1745.
16. Id. at 1753 (The Court found California's unconscionability rules were preempted by
the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")).
17. 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013).

18.

Id.

19.
20.
21.

Id.at 2308.
Id.
Id.

22. Id. ("The agreement also provides that there shall be no right or authority for any
Claims to be arbitrated on a class action basis.") (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
23.
24.

Id. at 2310 (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 166-68 (1974)).
Id.

25.

Id. at2312.

26.
27.

Id. at 2309 (citing CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 668-69 (2012)).
Id.
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Second, even if the "effective vindication" theory is available to plaintiffs
challenging class arbitration waivers, which is not certain since the theory
has only been found in dicta,
the argument is unavailing in the face of a
28
valid arbitration clause.
Intuition might lead the public to conclude that the use of arbitration
clauses by mega-corporations is rapidly increasing. This line of thinking
though is slowed by other considerations of arbitration. Arbitration has
many benefits, namely that it is informal, less costly, efficient,
expeditious, and allows the parties to pick arbitrators with a specialized
knowledge of the disputed subject. 29 However, according to one
corporate franchise attorney, there is an important consideration that
scares some corporations from including arbitration provisions within
their consumer contracts. 30 "[T]he lack of an appeals process is a very
serious cost of using an arbitration clause-and an arbitral class
waiver." 31 Additionally, other reasons why corporations may elect to
forego the voluntary inclusion of arbitration provisions "include less
effective interim measures, the lack of summary adjudication,
inefficiencies in collection cases, and 32added uncertainty in the application
of otherwise certain legal remedies."
The question left remaining is whether corporations will view these
detriments as sufficient deterrents to not employ arbitration clauses with
arbitral class waivers following the corporate-friendly decisions in
Concepcion and American Express. Empirical data suggests that
corporations who do not already use arbitration clauses are unlikely to
switch following these favorable Supreme Court decisions.33 While this
data was used to look at corporate franchises, the implications still should
be given a great amount of weight.34
Bankruptcy courts are often forced to deal with arbitration clauses;
specifically, those that contain class arbitration waivers. The fear from
the Courts' decisions in Concepcion and American Express is that an
influx of arbitration provisions will be seen in bankruptcy courts because
28. Id. at 2310 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 637 n.19 (1985).
29. Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 8, at 973; see also Paul Bennett IV, "Waiving"
Goodbye to Arbitration:A ContractualApproach, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1609, 1618 (2012).
30. Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 8, at 973-74.
31. Id. at 973.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 991 ("Contrary to the predictions that all businesses would soon use arbitration
clauses in their standard form contracts after Concepcion, we find only a slight change in the use
of arbitration clauses in both of our samples .... ).
34. Id. at 989-90. ("[U]sing franchise agreements as a source of data has [definite]
advantages over other form contracts. The agreements are publicly available and have been for a
number of years, [so that] a reasonable degree of historical information is available. [However],
[w]e recognize the limitations of using franchise agreements [as well].").
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every corporate debtor or creditor will have one in its contracts.3 5 This
forces bankruptcy courts to either strike down arbitration provisions and
keep the proceeding within bankruptcy court jurisdiction; or, enforce the
36
clause and undercut bankruptcy's goal of centralized dispute resolution.
Neither option is desirable. However, because the data suggests that use
of arbitration provisions is holding steady, 37 the Court's recent decisions
are far from dire. Perhaps down the road there will be an influx of
arbitration clauses, but as it stands now, bankruptcy courts will not be
substantially more burdened by difficult decisions regarding the
enforceability of arbitration clauses.
CONFLICTING IDEOLOGIES-ARBITRATION AND BANKRUPTCY

The primary conundrum with arbitration clauses in bankruptcy is that
the two germane bodies of law promulgated by Congress have completely
conflicting ideologies. The Federal Arbitration Act's primary goal is to
enforce arbitration clauses when present within a contract. 38 The benefits
of arbitration are obvious; it unclogs the court system, allows arbiters
with experience in the matter presented to render judgments, and
expedites the decision-making process. 39 Further, the Supreme Court has
made it clear that the efficiency of litigation is secondary to enforcing
private contracts. 40 However, the Bankruptcy Code promotes centralized
dispute resolution. 4 ' The conflict is, needless to say, inherent. Sending a
portion of the debtor's estate proceedings to an outside arbiter removes
the bankruptcy court's ability to act as a centralized forum. 42 In some
cases this will be more detrimental to the proceedings than in others.
The question remaining is: How does a court decide when to enforce
one of these provisions? This is where the circuit split exists. While the
split is important and creates some confusion, the tests are very similar
and produce consistent results at this juncture. First, an understanding of
bankruptcy court jurisdiction is necessary to understanding how these
tests were formulated.
35. Id.at 991.
36. In re U.S. Lines, Inc., 197 F.3d 631, 640 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Societe Nationale
Algerienne Pour La Recherche, La Production, Le Transport, La Transformation et al.
Commercialisationdes Hydrocarburesv. Distrigas Corp., 80 B.R. 606, 610 (D. Mass. 1987)).

37. Id.
38. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (citing Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213,221 (1985)).
39. See Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 8, at 973.
40. E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002) ("[W]e look first to whether
the parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute, not to general policy goals . .
41. Inre US. Lines, Inc., 197 F.3d at 640.
42. See Resnick, supra note 4, at 184.
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THE BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTIONAL SCHEME

Before the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Northern Pipeline
43 bankruptcy courts and
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
district courts had the same powers with respect to most claims involving
a debtor." In fact, it used to be that most claims brought against a debtor
were capable of being heard and decided to completion by a bankruptcy
judge.45 However, that framework is unrecognizable compared to the
current one employed. Northern Pipeline stripped bankruptcy judges of
a tremendous amount of power after holding the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 unconstitutional.46
This constitutional holding centered on the fact that bankruptcy judges
are Article I judges and therefore cannot be granted the same broad and
encompassing powers that are granted to Article III judges. 47 According
to the Supreme Court, bankruptcy courts have the authority to effectuate
the "restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, which is at the core of the
federal bankruptcy power," 48 but must remove themselves from "the
adjudication of state-created private rights, such as the right to recover
contract damages. .

.

.,49

This changed the entire method by which

debtors were able to resolve their disputes as bankruptcy courts and
judges were forced to relinquish much of their power while the district
50
court and Article III judges retained their broad grant ofjurisdiction.
To cure this constitutional issue, in 1984 Congress revised part of the
judicial code that the Court in Northern Pipeline found impermissible. 5 '
The district court has been granted exclusive jurisdiction over all
bankruptcy cases. 52 They have also been given original, but not exclusive,
jurisdiction over all civil proceedings arising under, or arising in, the
Bankruptcy Code and all claims related to cases under the Bankruptcy
Code.53 Further, the district court has exclusive jurisdiction over all
property of the debtor and property of the estate at the commencement of
43. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
44. See Resnick, supra note 4, at 192.
45. Paul F. Kirgis, Arbitration,Bankruptcy, and Public Policy: A ContractarianAnalysis,
17 Am.BANKR. INST. L. REv. 503, 509 (2009).
46. See N. Pipeline Const. Co., 458 U.S. at 50; see also Wendy Lynn Trugman, The
Bankruptcy Act of 1984: Marathon Revisited, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 231, 234 (1984) ("The
plurality concluded that the Act impermissibly removed most, if not all, of the 'essential
attributes' of the judicial power of Article IIIcourts and vested it in Article I bankruptcy
[judges].").
47. 458 U.S. at 60-61.
48. Id. at 71.
49. Id.
50. See Kirgis, supra note 45, at 509-10.
51. See28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2006).
52. Id. § 1334(a).
53. Id. § 1334(b).
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the case.5 4 The new rules gave district judges the authority to "refer" all
cases arising under, arising in, or related to the Bankruptcy Code.55 This
is routinely accomplished by 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) in which the district
court judge enters "a general order of the district court that automatically
refers all cases and proceedings within its bankruptcy jurisdiction to the
bankruptcy court for its judicial district. 56
Critical to understanding bankruptcy court jurisdiction is
comprehending what arising in, arising under, and related to the
Bankruptcy Code means. "Arising in" means that, while not within a
specific provision of the Code, it is a claim that could only exist due to
the commencement of a bankruptcy case. 57 Circumstances in which a
claim "arises under" the Bankruptcy Code are those in which a specific
Code provision is at issue.5 8 "Related to" jurisdiction is the most distant
of the three subsets. It occurs in situations where the claim could be
brought in a forum other than a bankruptcy case but affects the
59
bankruptcy estate in some manner, whether directly or tangentially.
Under the 1984 reform, all60 of these may be referred to the bankruptcy
court via the district court.
The jurisdictional structure also creates a difference between what are
termed as core and non-core proceedings. "Core" proceedings are those
that relate directly to a bankruptcy court's primary functions. 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b)(2) provides a non-exhaustive list of claims that are considered
core proceedings by Congress. 62 "If a proceeding is core, the bankruptcy
judge may determine the matter by entering an appropriate order or
judgment, subject to ordinary appellate review in the district court or
bankruptcy appellate panel. 63
"Non-core" proceedings are those simply related to a bankruptcy case
such as state court breach of contract claims. 64 Under Northern Pipeline,
54. Id. § 1334(e).
55. See28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2000).
56. Resnick, supra note 4, at 193 (discussing the impacts of Marathon).
57. Stoe v. Flaherty, 436 F.3d 209, 216 (3d Cir. 2006) ((explaining the derivatives of
current bankruptcy jurisdiction in the context of a request for remand and abstention (citing In re
Combustion Eng'g,Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 225 (3d Cir. 2005)).
58. Id.
59. See Resnick, supra note 4, at 193. An example of this type of scenario can be found "if
the debtor in a chapter 11 bankruptcy case commences a breach of contract action against a party
to a prebankruptcy contract," then "that proceeding would be "related to" the bankruptcy case
because the outcome would affect the value of the bankruptcy estate and, therefore, would be
within the bankruptcy jurisdiction of the district court and may be referred to the bankruptcy court
under section 157(a)."
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(a).
61. See Resnick, supra note 4, at 193-94.
62. See § 157(b)(2).
63. See Resnick, supra note 4, at 194.
64. Id.
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these proceedings must be resolved by an Article III judge or by a nonfederal tribunal with jurisdiction over the matter. 65 However, the
bankruptcy judge may still preside over the non-core proceeding but they
may only make recommendations to the district judge. 66 Either party may
object to the bankruptcy court's findings and conclusions, which initiates
a de novo review by the district court. 6 7 Furthermore, with the consent of
all parties the district judge "may refer a proceeding related to a case
under title 11 to a bankruptcy judge to hear and determine and to enter
"68 Any appeals from these
appropriate orders and judgments...
proceedings are heard by the district court. 6 9 That is the structure within
which bankruptcy courts must operate; therefore, it is now appropriate to
explore the case law that guides the bankruptcy and appellate courts
present decision-making.
THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT'S POWER-MCMAHON

The Supreme Court's milestone decision in Shearson/American
Express Inc. v. McMahon70 laid the groundwork for determining the
enforceability of arbitration clauses in bankruptcy courts. The McMahons
were the trustees and customers of accounts with Shearson/American
Express, a licensed brokerage firm. 7 1 Within their brokerage agreement
was an arbitration clause that Shearson/American Express wished to
invoke after the McMahons filed suit.72 The McMahons alleged that
Shearson/American Express violated § 10(b) (Rule lOb-5) of the
Securities and Exchange Act "by engaging in fraudulent, excessive
trading" on their accounts and by "making false statements and omitting
material facts from the advice given" to the McMahons. 73 Hence, the
mandatory arbitration provision conflicted with an existing federal'
statute. 74
The Supreme Court was thus obligated to decide whether the
arbitration clause in the brokerage agreement was enforceable or whether
the dispute should remain within the federal judiciary's purview. This led
the Court to articulate a "standard for courts to use when evaluating
65. N. PipeLine Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 83-84 (1982).
66. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1).
67. Id.
68. Id. § 157(c)(2).
69. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2010).
70. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
71. Id. at 222-23.
72. Id. at 223.
73. Id. (The complaint also included a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO) claim).
74. See id.
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whether Congress intended that a countervailing federal statute would
override the Arbitration Act with respect to disputes involving a certain
subject matter." 75
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, stated: "[t]he burden is on the
party opposing arbitration.., to show that Congress intended to preclude
a waiver ofjudicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue. 76 The Court
eventually held that in order to defeat the Arbitration Act, the other
federal statute at issue must demonstrate congressional intent to convey
federal jurisdiction based on any one of three things: (1) the other
statute's text; (2) the other statute's legislative history; or (3) if there is a
conflict between the purposes of the other statute and the Arbitration
Act.77 Ultimately, Shearson/American Express was able to enforce the
arbitration agreement as the Court found that the Securities and78Exchange
Act failed to meet any of the three criteria pronounced above.
However, bankruptcy judges have found the standards in McMahon
difficult to apply to arbitration clauses because the text and history of the
79
provisions relating to bankruptcy jurisdiction offer little direction.
Therefore, all of the circuit courts to decide this issue to date have, at the
very least, asked whether an arbitration clause between a debtor and a
creditor
would pose an "irreconcilable conflict" with the Bankruptcy
80
Code.
In deciding whether to enforce an arbitration clause, bankruptcy
courts must first decide if there is an inherent conflict between the goal
of enforcing arbitration clauses, as articulated by McMahon, and
bankruptcy's goal of centralized dispute resolution. Bankruptcy courts
use a fact-intensive approach and look at whether a conflict exists within
the underlying dispute on a case-by-case basis. 8 One of the primary
issues with fact-intensive analyses is that, often times, conflicting
82 According to Alan Resnick, the end result is a
opinions are released.
"wide body of law." 83 However, it may not be entirely appropriate to say
that appellate courts facing these issues have reached "divergent
'
decisions. "84
75.
76.

Resnick, supra note 4, at 201.
Id.

77.
78.

Id.at 202.
482 U.S. at 238, 242.

79. Note, Jurisdictionin Bankruptcy Proceedings:A Test Casefor Implied Repeal of the
FederalArbitrationAct, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2296, 2299 (2004).

80. Id.
81. Resnick, supra note 4, at 202.
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. See id.("The end result of such analysis is a wide body of law consisting of divergent
decisions issued by various appellate courts."). While this may be true to a certain extent, the wide
body of law might have more to do with the varying circumstances of each case than with a lack
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Instead, three appellate courts have added an additional factor to the
McMahon inquiry." Despite differing approaches between circuit courts,
McMahon provides the basic standard to resolve whether arbitration
clauses between a debtor and a creditor in bankruptcy are enforceable and
can remove the dispute from bankruptcy court jurisdiction.
JUDICIAL CASE HISTORY

A. Non-Core Proceedings-Hays
The first case discussing arbitration clauses in bankruptcy postMcMahon was the Third Circuit's decision in Hays and Co. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce,Fenner & Smith, Inc.,86 which along with McMahon, lay
the current framework of the law. Until recently, Hays' holding was
interpreted as applicable only to non-core matters and therefore, while
emblematic of the current state of the law, it was not viewed as having
precedential value when core matters were at issue. However, a recent
Third Circuit decision has extended Hays'reach.
In Hays, a chapter 11 trustee brought securities fraud claims under
state and federal law as well as fraudulent conveyance and constructive
trust claims under § 544(b) against Merrill Lynch.87 The brokerage
agreement signed pre-petition contained an arbitration clause, which
Merrill Lynch sought to invoke. 88 The underlying dispute was over a
debtor-derivative, pre-petition contract claim, which is viewed as a non89
core matter.
Adhering to the Supreme Court's decision in McMahon, the Third
Circuit enforced the arbitration clause in part. 90 The Court reasoned,
"[l]ike any statutory directive, the Arbitration Act's mandate may be
overridden by a contrary congressional command. The burden is on the
party opposing arbitration, however, to show that Congress intended to

of a clear directive or test.
85. See In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 671 F.3d 1011, 1021 (9th Cir. 2012); In re Mintze,
434 F.3d 222, 231-32 (3d Cir. 2006); In re Nat'l Gypsum Co., 118 F.3d 1056, 1069 (5th Cir.
1997).
86. 885 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1989).
87. Id. at 1149.
88. Id.at 1150.
89. Id. at 1156-57 n.9 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (2006)) ("The non-§ 544(b) claims
made by Hays involve non-core proceedings because they do not involve: the administration of
the estate; the allowance of claims against the estate; the voidance of preferences or fraudulent
transfers; determinations as to dischargeability of debts; priorities of liens; or confirmation of a
plan.").
90. See id.at 1156-57.
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' 91
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue."
Hays found the 1984 Bankruptcy Act, which distinguishes core and noncore matters and the method by which they were treated, as convincing
evidence of Congress's intent to keep core matters within the bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction. 92 As for non-core matters, the Third Circuit found
that Congress evinced no intent to keep those exclusively within the
bankruptcy court's dominion. 93 It therefore enforced the arbitration
94
clause in favor of Merrill Lynch with regard to the derivative claims.
However, Hays did not enforce the arbitration clause for the § 544(b)
claims, leaving
the door open for extra judicial interpretation of core
95

proceedings.

B. Core Proceedings-TheThird andFifth Circuits
The Fifth Circuit was the first court to directly address the issue of
enforceability of arbitration clauses in core proceedings following the
Supreme Court's ruling in McMahon. In re National Gypsum96 stemmed
from National Gypsum's chapter 11 filing following asbestos related
claims. 97 After its insurance carriers tried to collect what National
Gypsum said were pre-filing claims, National Gypsum alleged violations
of its chapter 11 discharge and plan of reorganization. 98 One of the
insurance carriers sought to invoke an arbitration clause
that National
99
reorganization.
of
plan
its
via
assumed
had
Gypsum
The Fifth Circuit responded by adopting a test to be applied on a caseby-case basis when dealing with core matters.100 The test first asks
whether the core proceeding derives from bankruptcy rights (those
coming entirely from the Code) or non-bankruptcy rights (those coming
from state law). 10 1 The second part of the test asks whether arbitrating a
certain type of core proceeding would conflict with the goals of the
Bankruptcy Code; namely whether arbitration would erode "the goal of
91. Id. at 1156 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985)) (emphasis omitted).
92. Id.at1157.

93.

Id.

94. Id. at 1150.
95. Id. at 1153, 1155 (citing Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 625; Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
96. 118 F.3d 1056 (5th Cir. 1997).

97. Id. at 1058.
98. Id. at 1059-60.
99. Id. at 1060.
100. Id. at 1068.

101. See id at 1069 ("We think that, at least where the cause of action at issue is not
derivative of the pre-petition legal or equitable rights possessed by a debtor but rather is derived
entirely from the federal rights conferred by the Bankruptcy Code, a bankruptcy court retains
significant discretion ....
").
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centralized resolution of purely bankruptcy issues, the need to protect
creditors and reorganizing debtors from piecemeal litigation, and the
02
undisputed power of a bankruptcy court to enforce its own orders."'
While this standard is wholly compliant with the third part of the Supreme
Court's directive in McMahon, the Fifth Circuit implemented the step of
determining where the rights come from, before looking at10"whether
3
arbitration would be consistent with the purpose of the Code."
When looking at In re National Gypsum and Hays, the Third and Fifth
Circuits have articulated tests for bqth core and non-core proceedings
consistent with wide judicial discretion based on the underlying goals of
Congress and the Bankruptcy Code. Further, the Third Circuit adopted
Hays' reasoning in the context of core proceedings when it decided In re
Mintze, which, like Hays, focused on federal and state issues, this time in
the context of the Truth-in-Lending Act. 104 The In re Mintze court implied
that, while most courts interpreted the Hays opinion to be limited to
purely non-core proceedings, that construal was incorrect. 10 5 Rather,
Hays "did not seek to distinguish between core and non-core
proceedings[; . . . it] sought to distinguish between causes of action
derived from the debtor and bankruptcy actions that the Bankruptcy Code
created for the benefit of the creditors of the estate." 10 6 Now Hays applies
in all contexts under Third Circuit precedent.
C. Core Proceedings-TheSecond andFourth Circuits
The Second Circuit's decision in In re U.S. Lines, Inc. 107 mirrors the
Fifth Circuit's In re National Gypsum opinion, but with a different focus.
In In re U.S. Lines, the Second Circuit chose to focus only on the
conflicting philosophy element and ignore the Fifth Circuit's inquiry into
08
whether the rights stemmed from bankruptcy or non-bankruptcy law.'
In regard to certain pre-bankruptcy insurance policies, In re U.S. Lines
was brought by an already reorganized debtor and the trust created for the

102.
103.

Id.
Id.

104. 434 F.3d 222, 226 (3d Cir. 2006).
105. See id at 230 ("We disagree with this interpretation-that the application of Hays is
limited to non-core proceedings. First, Hays applied the Supreme Court's McMahon standard,
which applies to all statutory claims subject to applicable arbitration clauses, not just to those
claims arising in non-core bankruptcy proceedings."); see also Resnick, supra note 4, at 210.
106. 434 F.3d at 230.
107. 197 F.3d 631 (2d Cir. 1999).
108. See id. at 640 (citing Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885
F.2d 1149, 1161 (3d Cir. 1989)) ("The Arbitration Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court
dictates that an arbitration clause should be enforced unless doing so would seriously jeopardize
the objectives of the Code.").
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debtor within the reorganization period. 10 9 Some of these insurance
policies contained arbitration clauses." o The Second Circuit found that
these policies, while pre-bankruptcy contracts, constituted core
core
proceedings because "the impact these contracts have on other
11
bankruptcy functions nevertheless render the proceedings core."'
The Second Circuit ultimately adjudicated a decision in favor of the2
debtor and allowed the dispute to remain within the bankruptcy court."
The Court, however, much like the Third and Fifth Circuits, notably
stated that some proceedings termed core would present a situation in
which arbitration clauses are enforceable. 113 Moreover, "[i]n exercising
its discretion over whether, in core proceedings, arbitration provisions
ought to be denied effect, the bankruptcy court must still 'carefully
determine whether any underlying purpose of the Bankruptcy114Code
would be adversely affected by enforcing an arbitration clause."'
This internally quoted language, coming directly from Hays, shows
the Second Circuit's emphasis on bankruptcy policy's "inexorable pull
towards centralization" as opposed to arbitration's decentralized
In the view of the Second Circuit, if the bankruptcy court
approach.'
"has properly considered the conflicting policies in accordance with law,
[appellate courts should] acknowledge [the bankruptcy court's] exercise
of discretion and show due deference to its determination that arbitration6
will seriously jeopardize a particular core bankruptcy proceeding.""
Therefore, the Second Circuit's view of core proceedings is one that
allows bankruptcy courts discretion based entirely on competing policy
goals." 7 However, the Court, in dictum, may have suggested that
arbitration clauses could be nullified in non-core proceedings, a first
118
among other circuits to have rendered a decision on this specific issue.
The Fourth Circuit adhered to this logic in In re White Mountain

109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 634.
Id.
Id. at 638.
Id. at641.

113.

Id. at 640.

114. Id. (quoting Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149,
1161 (3d Cir. 1989)).
115. Id. (citing Societe Nationale Algerienne Pour La Recherche, La Production, Le
Transport,La Transformation et La Commercialisationdes Hydrocarburesv. Distrigas Corp.,
80 B.R. 606, 610 (D. Mass. 1987)); id at 639 ("The arbitration preference is particularly strong

for international arbitration agreements." (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985))).
116. Id. at641.
117. See Note, supra note 79, at 2303.

118. 197 F.3d at 640 ("Such a conflict is lessened in non-core proceedings which are
unlikely to present a conflict sufficient to override by implication the presumption in favor of
arbitration.").
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Mining Co., L.L.C. 1" 9 In White Mountain, the debtor had operating and
sale agreements with a creditor, which contained international arbitration
agreements. 2 Upon invoking these arbitration agreements, the Fourth
Circuit first found that these were core proceedings and thus analyzed the
issue in that context.1 2 1 White Mountain noted that two distinct
possibilities exist: (1) U.S. Lines and its sister circuits were correct and
not all proceedings termed "core" result in defeating an arbitration clause;
or, (2) the statutory text giving bankruptcy courts core jurisdiction is
Congress's manifestation of its intent to keep all core proceedings in the
bankruptcy court. 122 However, the Court decided passed on the
opportunity to decide that issue 123 and instead focused on the conflicting
ideology prong that US. Lines used. 24 This shows the Fourth Circuit's
willingness to consider a bright-line test in which core proceedings may
always defeat an arbitration clause; it is the only circuit to articulate such
an approach. However, it left the answer to that question for another day.
D. Revisiting the Issue-Thorpe
The case that has re-sparked interest in this issue is the Ninth Circuit's
decision in In re Thorpe Insulation Co., which centered around a
settlement agreement made by the debtor, Thorpe, and a creditor,
Continental Insurance Co. 125 Thorpe manufactured insulation containing
asbestos, which resulted in an onslaught of litigation from victims of the

119.
120.

403 F.3d 164 (4th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 166.

121. Id. at 169 ("The adversary proceeding was a core proceeding because Phillips's
complaint against White Mountain (the debtor) sought a determination that the advances of$10.6
million from Phillips to White Mountain were loans "due and owing" from White Mountain to
Phillips.").
122. Id. (citingln re US. Lines, Inc., 197 F.3d 631, 640 (2d Cir. 1999)).
The Second Circuit in United States Lines did not deduce from the statutory text

a congressional intent to prohibit entirely the arbitration of core issues: a
determination that a proceeding is core will not automatically give the
bankruptcy court discretion to stay arbitration. There is the counter argument,
however, that the statutory text giving bankruptcy courts core-issue jurisdiction
reveals a congressional intent to choose those courts in exclusive preference to
all other adjudicative bodies, including boards of arbitration, to decide core
claims.
Id.
123. Id. ("We need not decide today whether the statutory text itself demonstrates
congressional intent to override arbitration for core claims .....
124. Id.
125. In the matter of Thorpe Insulation Co. v. Thorpe Insulation Co. and Official Creditors'
Comm. of Thorpe Insulation Co. & Pac. Insulation Co., 671 F.3d 1101, 1014 (9th Cir. 2012).
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asbestos product's harmful effects several years later.' 26 After Thorpe
reached its policy limits under its insurance plan with Continental,
127
Thorpe attempted to access a no-limits provision within the policy. 128
After an arbitrator ruled in favor of Continental, Thorpe appealed.
which led to the settlement agreement at issue in which Thorpe agreed
not to, "assign, transfer, convey or sell to any entity or person any cause
of action ...or part thereof, arising out of or connected with the matters
released herein, and that they are the only persons or entities entitled to
recover for damages under such claims....129
Shortly thereafter, Thorpe desired to confirm a plan of reorganization
before filing for bankruptcy by creating a trust pursuant to § 524(g) of the
Bankruptcy Code. 130 § 524(g) was designed to combat debilitating
quantities of asbestos related claims by allowing insurers to settle with
the debtor, and place the money in a trust. 131 The insurers that settled with
Thorpe were released from coverage for future claims, but the plan
allowed claimants to directly sue non-settling insurers. 132 Continental,
which did not settle, claimed this was a violation of their settlement
agreement and that the dispute should be arbitrated pursuant to its earlier
agreement with 34the debtor.' 33 Thorpe then proceeded to file for chapter
11 bankruptcy.'
The Ninth Circuit rejected Continental's claim that the dispute should
be sent to arbitration. 135 The Court followed Third Circuit and Fifth
Circuit precedent, employing the aforementioned two-part test for
determining whether an arbitration clause in a pre-petition contract
involving the debtor should be enforced. 136 Thus, the Third, Fifth, and
Ninth Circuits are aligned in administering this two-part test while the
Second and Fourth Circuits focus only on the McMahon inquiry.

126. Id. This is notably similar to the facts from the Fifth Circuit's decision in In re Nat'l
Gypsum, which is the standard this court adopted.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.

129. Id.at 1015.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id. at 1015-16; see also H.R. REP.No.103-835 at 40-41 (1994).
In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 671 F.3d at 1016.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1024.

136. Id.at 1020-21. The Ninth Circuit held that, "[w]e must decide whether Congress
intended to make an exception to the Arbitration Act for claims arising in bankruptcy proceedings
" thereby...
adopting the non-bankruptcy/bankruptcy distinction from In re Nat'l Gypsum. The
court then went on to say that "[w]e ask, then, whether there is an inherent conflict between
arbitration and the underlying purposes of the Bankruptcy Code." Id.(citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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THE WRENCH-STERN V MARSHALL

The wrench in the system is the Supreme Court's decision in Stern v.
Marshall.137 Stern is a constitutional holding that has thrown what
everyone previously knew of bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction into a
maelstrom. 138 While the background of the case is dense and
complicated, 139 the crucial facts of Stern as applied to bankruptcy
jurisdiction are relatively simple.
The dispute centered on Vickie Marshall, also known as Anna Nicole
Smith, and her filing chapter 11 bankruptcy following the death of her
husband, J. Howard Marshall, who died with a vast fortune. 140 J. Howard
left his estate in the form of a pourover trust to his son, Pierce. 14' Vickie
then claimed that J. Howard intended to leave her half of his estate, and
that Pierce, the sole beneficiary in J. Howard's trust,142had fraudulently
induced J. Howard to devise his estate in this manner.
After Vickie filed bankruptcy, Pierce filed a proof of claim, seeking
damages for defamation stemming from Vickie's allegations regarding
Pierce's potential meddling in J. Howard's affairs. 143 Vickie combated
this claim with a counterclaim for tortious interference for her purported
share of the estate. 144 Ultimately, the bankruptcy court threw out Pierce's
defamation claim and awarded Vickie a total of $425 million between
compensatory and punitive damages. 145 Following the judgment, Pierce
asserted that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction
because Vickie's
46
claim was not a core proceeding under § 157(b)(2).1
As explained earlier, bankruptcy courts may only enter final
judgments in core proceedings, 147 whereas in non-core proceedings they
may only submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the
district court 148 unless otherwise agreed upon by all parties. 149 Therefore,
137. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
138. See Ralph Brubaker, A "Summary" Statutory andConstitutionalTheory of Bankruptcy
Judges' Core JurisdictionAfter Stern v. Marshall, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 121, 135-36 (2012).
139. 131 S. Ct. at 2600. Chief Justice Roberts quotes Charles Dickens in reference to the
complications associated with the facts of Stern. "This suit has, in course of time, become so
complicated, that... no two ... lawyers can talk about it for five minutes, without coming to a
total disagreement as to all the premises." Id. (alteration in original).
140. Id.at2601.
14i. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 300 (2006). This was the first time the Supreme
Court had the opportunity to hear the facts of the case.
142. 131 S. Ct. at2601.
143. 547 U.S. at 300.
144. 131 S.Ct. at2601.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. 28 US.C. § 157(b)(1) (2006).
148. See id.
§ 157(c)(1).
149. Seeid. § 157(c)(2).
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if Pierce's argument was correct, the $425 million judgment would be
void. The District Court for the Middle District of California ruled in
Vickie's favor; however, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed 150on grounds unrelated to the Supreme Court's ultimate
holding.

Justice Roberts, writing for the Supreme Court, affirmed the final
judgment of the Ninth Circuit and held that bankruptcy judges lack power
under Article III of the Constitution to enter a final order on a state law
counterclaim that is ruled on independently from the creditor's proof of
claim.151 While Congress granted bankruptcy judges the statutory power
to enter these orders under § 157(b)(2)(C), Article I judges do not have
the constitutional authority, regardless of whether they are termed core
proceedings by Congress.' 52 Therefore, bankruptcy judges may not
decide all core proceedings, thereby changing the scope of bankruptcy
courts' jurisdiction. 5 3 However,154the Court stated that its holding is
limited strictly to § 157(b)(2)(C).
Thus, the remaining and divisive question is: How far might this
holding extend? If the road ends with § 157(b)(2)(C), then the
transformation is far less radical than some have feared and courts can
continue acting in a relatively similar manner. Yet, some lower court
decisions have interpreted Stern's reach to include any core proceeding
155
with a state law element (e.g., those that confer "private rights").

Ultimately, this question has a heavy impact on the enforceability of
arbitration clauses in bankruptcy. The current state of affairs allows most
bankruptcy courts to overrule arbitration clauses in core proceedings
because of the goal of centralized dispute resolution. However, if
bankruptcy courts are forced to farm out some of these core proceedings
due to a broader interpretation of Stern, then the goal of centralization is
mooted and arbitration clauses should be enforced in core proceedings.
Further, the tests currently employed by the appellate courts should
adapt to include a caveat for Stern. They must account for the fact that
state law issues, even if arising under or arising in chapter 11, may be
outside of the bankruptcy courts' constitutional jurisdiction. When this is
the case, Stern must first be applied before deciding the applicability of
an arbitration clause. However, a lower court will have great difficulty
150.
151.
152.
153.

131 S. Ct. at 2602-03.
Id. at 2620.
See id. at 2608 (discussing the differences between Article I and Article Il powers).
See id.

154. Id. at 2620. In citing the U.S. Amicus Curiae, Chief Justice Roberts states, "we agree
with the United States that the question presented here is a narrow one." Id.
155. See Tyson A. Crist, Stern v. Marshall: Application of the Supreme Court'sLandmark
Decisionin the Lower Courts, 86 Am. BANKR. L.J 627, 639-40 (2012). However, "the trend is to

follow the narrow view ...

"Id. at 140.
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determining with conviction whether Stern is applicable to its present
case.
WHERE Do WE GO FROM HERE?

Amidst all the confusion and chaos is a minor circuit split. The tests
are fairly similar and every circuit agrees that courts may not refuse to
compel arbitration in non-core proceedings. 5 6 However, some fear that
widely varying results could become a problem because of the lack of a
bright-line rule. The tests as they currently stand require a fact-intensive
analysis in which the court "arbitrarily" decides whether this "inexorable
pull" towards centralization outweighs the Supreme Court's strong
backing of arbitration agreements. In fact, one commentator has
suggested that the need for reform is pressing and he proposes offering a
legislative bright-line rule. 157 Though, it seems unrealistic to expect
Congress to take any action on minutiae such as this.
Some may call it befuddling that the Supreme Court has not answered
a circuit split that Congress is unlikely to resolve. Yet, it seems to make
sense to allow for a fact-intensive analysis. Bankruptcy law, via word of
mouth alone, has a reputation for unpredictable and sometimes comical
results due to the complexity and innumerable interpretations of the
Code. Perhaps the Supreme Court has the correct notion in allowing the
circuits to decide this on their own, although where federal statutory
interpretation lacks consistency, there is a legitimate argument for
clarifying a muddled issue. However, in staying true to what might be
bankruptcy law's defining attribute, the Court gives a bit of comedic
gratification to the field.
While reform may not be entirely necessary, the most practicable
reform is one of a judicial nature. Congress is unlikely to act regarding
this topic as it spurns little debate and is not a pressing national concern.
Therefore, practical reform would involve the Supreme Court laying
down a case-by-case standard. While a bright-line rule may seem
preferable, it is unworkable. McMahon requires arbitration agreements
be enforced unless a congressional statute clearly expresses a contrary
intent. 158 Therefore, this must be included within any test adopted by the
Supreme Court. Further, every circuit to decide the issue correctly
includes this within their determination of whether to enforce an
arbitration clause. However, a bright-line rule would not be capable of
156. In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 671 F.3d 1011, 1021 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).
The exception to this, as noted previously, would be the Second Circuit's decision in In re US.
Lines, but to say that they do not agree with their sister circuits is speculative.
157. See Resnick, supra note 4, at 213-14.
158. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987).
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including this standard because, by its very nature, the standard produces
varying results.
It would be wise to remove the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits inquiry
into whether the dispute originates out of non-bankruptcy law. This part
of the test only adds confusion. Rather, the most sensible reform is to
adopt the Second and Fourth Circuit's one-step test and supplement it
with a formulation of factors that look at whether Congress had a contrary
intent.
These factors could include whether the dispute stems from nonbankruptcy law. Including it within the factors and not the test allows
courts to look primarily at whether it is a core proceeding and then base
their argument on the circumstances presented. Other factors could
potentially be the need to protect creditors, and efficiency in resolving the
dispute. This is a non-exhaustive list, but this type of flexibility gives a
complex issue more leeway and allows equitable results.
Avoiding a bright-line rule that is focused on whether a proceeding
arises out of bankruptcy or non-bankruptcy law as suggested in White
Mountain also, somewhat, circumvents the problem of Stern v. Marshall.
White Mountain suggested finding all core proceedings remain within the
bankruptcy court. However, the decision in Stern has rendered this topic
vastly more confusing primarily because it is no longer clear when core
proceedings may be allowed to remain in the bankruptcy court. Nonbankruptcy rights, even those termed core by Congress, are
immeasurably more likely
to be kicked out of bankruptcy court from the
59
outset following Stern. 1
Imagine the following scenario: a court finds itself with a case where
a proceeding is termed core under § 157(b)(2) yet deals with nonbankruptcy law and, under Stern, should be kicked out as an
unconstitutional exercise of bankruptcy court jurisdiction. A bright-line
rule would fail in this context because a core proceeding could not remain
in bankruptcy court jurisdiction. However, the parties to the proceeding
may not become aware1 60 of this until an appellate court decides that
Stern applies to their case. The bright-line rule fails miserably and causes
hardship to the defeated party. While the Court's holding was narrow, it
is likely that other proceedings termed "core" are not constitutionally
permissible for bankruptcy courts to hear. That is why, should any reform
be necessary, adopting the one-part test with a list of factors for courts to
159. See Crist, supra note 151, at 682. Here, Crist suggests the ultimate solution would be
giving bankruptcy judges Article Ill power. While not posited in this Note, that solution would
remove any difficulty of the Stern decision in all contexts, including arbitration. Crist notes that
Congress is probably unwilling to address this solution though. However, this may be the
preferred answer to the difficulty of applying Stern. Id.
160. If the bankruptcy court is constitutionally prevented from hearing the case, then
theoretically, a mandatory arbitration provision would be enforced.
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consider makes sense and is fairly close to where the law stands presently,
which makes restructuring the system a reasonable and simple exercise.
CONCLUSION

After exploring the issue, the confusion may not be as great as it
appears on the surface. The circuit split produces different results, but
that may have more to do with the facts of each case rather than the
current state of the law. That is the nature of bankruptcy. Further, this
alone is not an apt reason to decimate the judicial decisions and create a
bright-line rule. Rather, the appropriate answer may be to simplify the
circuits' tests and go from there. At the very least, that approach is worth
experimentation. Finally, the current usage of mandatory arbitration
provisions also seems to intimate that corporate debtors will not be
burdening courts with these provisions any more than they were in the
past. It would appear now, that these two treacherous and winding roads
meet to form a path that most can follow.

186
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